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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
ACCULOG, INC., a State of
Colorado corporation, ROBERT
PFISTER and KENTON SHAW,
co-partners doing business
under the firm name and style
of ACCULOG FIELD SERVICES,

CASE NO. 18133

Plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
KEITH PETERSON, dba
PETERSON FORD,
Defendant-Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT IN FAVOR
OF THE PLAINTIFFS ON THE ISSUE OF THE PLAINTIFFS' COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE AND IN NOT BARRING DEFENSE COUNSEL FROM ARGUING TO THE JURY
THAT FAILURE TO HAVE A FIRE EXTINGUISHER CONSTITUTED NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFFS
The Respondent's Brief confirms that there was no issue
of negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs to be presented to
the jury.

All "issues" raised by the Defendant are without sup-

port in the evidentiary record.

All "issues" raised by the Defen-

dant necessarily would have required the jury to speculate.
The Respondent's Brief first attempts to dredge up two rea·
sons, in addition to his improper fire extinguisher argument,
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that the jury "could" have used to find the Plaintiffs' negligent.
The Defendant now attempts to advance these reasons even though
trial counsel did not consider them worthy of being argued to the
jury.
.·First, the Defendant cites the testimony of Mr. Shaw
where 'he states that he and Mr. Gates had smelled gasoline for a
minute or two before the fire.

The Defendant's brief conveniently

ignores the prior testimony of Jim Gates wherein Gates testified
that it took time to investigate and locate the source of the
.gasoline odor since they had a gasoline can inside the van which
also omitted an odor:
Q

Do you recall about what time you were done logging
the final hole that day?

A

I believe it was a quarter until 9:00.

Q

And, again, prior to that time, had you observed any
functional problem of any kind with the van?

A

No.

Q

What occurred at that time?

A

Well, we finished our job and wrapped everything up
and proceeded to come back to town.
And we had made
it, oh, a couple of miles at the most and we smelled
some gasoline.
And, at first, you know, we weren't
sure exactly what it was, and I turned around to see
if it could have been the gas can that we kept there
in the van, but it wasn't.

Q

What gas can are you ref erring to now?

A

We have a two-gallon gas can that we used to run our
generator.

Q

Where was it located?

A

It's a gas can that is located in the middle section
of the van.

Q

All right.
Where were you and Mr. Shaw at that time
in the van?

1
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A

Kenton was driving, and I was in the passenger's
seat.

Q

All right.
Now, you were testifying regarding smelling the gasoline, and you thought it might be related
to that can.
Go ahead and tell us about that again.

A

I smelled the gasoline--I don't think any words were
spoken, but I looked at Kenton and I realized that he
acknowledged something was out of norm. And I smelled
around to see if I could locate it.
And it did seem to be coming from the engine compartment. And within a minute of that, there was a
pop, and Kenton--well, the~e was a pop.
I'll let it
go at that.

Q

Is that the best you can describe it, or is that an
accurate description of what happened?

A

Well, it was kind of a kawoosh sound.
It wasn't real
sharp or real loud, but we knew something had happened.

Q

And what happened then?

A

We stopped the van and got
mentioned that he saw some
we went around in front of
could extinguish the fire.
manner. We threw dirt and
could find on the engine.

Q

Before we come to that, let's go back to the point
before you even got out of the van, if we could. How
fast was the van traveling at that time?

A

Oh, a couple of miles an hour, I guess.
at a very slow rate.

out. And I think Kenton
flames, or something. And
the vehicle to see if we
And we proceeded in that
rocks and everything we

It was going

The Defendant's brief, after citing the alleged unreasonable delay in stopping the van, then asserts that the jury should
have been allowed to speculate that, had the Plaintiffs stopped
the engine a few seconds prior to the ignition of the gasoline,
which had squirted on the engine, " ... there probably would have
been no fire, explosion or damage to the engine or any portion of
the van."

(Respondent's Brief at page 10) .

tion on the part of the Defendant.

This is pure specula-

The Defendant cites no testi-
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many whatsoever to prove that stopping the engine would have prevented the fire.

In fact, the testimony of the Plaintiff's ex-

pert, which the jury accepted, was to just the opposite conclusion
namely, that the fire was caused by gasoline collecting on the
top of the hot engine and then being ignited by hot engine components (T. 114-119).

Even had the engine been stopped a few

seconds earlier, the hot engine components could still have ignited the gasoline which had been squirted out of the defectively
installed fuel filter.

.

The burden was on the Defendant to prove

.alleged negligence on the part of the Plaintiffs and the Defendant
did not meet his burden because he did not provide any evidence
to prove that a few seconds delay in stopping the engine would
have prevented the hot engine components from igniting the gaso1 ine.

~

Second, the Defendant's brief seeks to find negligence on
the part of the Plaintiffs because they did not have the Def endant's employees check into the possibility that the van's original "cuttj_ng out" problem had been caused by a non-standard ignition system.

This again asks the Court to speculate that some-

thing else caused the fire.
expert,

Mr~

However, nobody, not the Plaintiffs'

Caldwell, nor the Defendant's expert, Dr. Lirnpert,

nor the Defendant's mechanics, nor anyone else, testified that a
faulty ignition system caused the fire.

To the absolute con-

trary, Dr. Limpert and Mr. Caldwell both agreed that the fire was
a fuel system fire and not an ignition system caused fire (T. 114119, T.

29L~).

When the foregoing have been objectively considered, it
becomes clear why the Defendant's counsel did not argue these
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"issues" to the jury.

They were pure speculation with no b;1sis

in the record to support them.

There was no issue of comparat.ive

negligence to go to the jury except as related, erroneously, to
the Plaintiffs' failure to have a fire extinguisher.
·While the Defendant attempts to quote the court to show
that the court believed that there were other negligent acts of
the Plaintiffs which caused the fire (Respondent's Brief at page
22),

the statement relied upon shows that the court was only

talking of possible negligent acts of the Plaintiffs in failing
to mitigate damages by not putting out the fire in the best way once
the fire had begun.

The court stated:

But I think it's a legitimate matter and
can be handled by both of you in your arguments in having it considered as one of the
negligent acts, if it is considered to be a
negligent act by the jury that affects some
portion of the damages, possibly.
(T. 340-342).
(Emphasis added.)
The court clearly was not talking about negligent causation of
the fire but rather of failure to mitigate damages by using a
fire extinguisher once the fire had occurred.

This may be fur-

ther verified by referring to the entire content of the court's
remarks which are set forth in pages 12-14 of the Appellant's
Brief.
Completely aside from the foregoing, remains the fact
that by permitting the Defendant's fire extinguisher argument the
court improperly invited the jury to find that the Plaintiffs'
failure to have a fire extinguisher constituted comparative
negligence and further invited the jury to speculate without the
aid of any evidence that a fire extinguisher would have in fact
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prevented the damage caused to the van and its contents.

The

fire extinguisher argument constitutes reversible error aside
from the question of whether or not other actions of the Plaintiffs were negligent since the argument was clearly prejudicial
in and of itself.
The Defendant's guest vs. host statute argument and the
cases related thereto are simply inapposite to the Plaintiffs'
case since they all involve an element of a conscious and knowing
assumption of the risk by a guest who enters into a vehicle where
.a known present danger exists.

The Plaintiffs in the case before

the court did not know that the Defendant was going to cause their
vehicle to burn down.

Only if they had known, could they be held

responsible for failing to put a fire extinguisher into their van ..
The seat belt analogy asserted by the Plaintiffs is directly on
point since a person in a car does not know that someone else is
going to negligently drive into him and cause him injury.

Hampton

v. State Highway Commission, 209 Kan. 565, 498 P2d 236 (1972).

As

noted in the ,Plaintiff's prior brief, the State of Washington has
refused to allow the use of comparative negligence_principals to
defeat an injured person's right to recover against a negligent
driver of another automobile where the injured person was not
wearing a seat belt.
3d 225 (1977).

Amend v. Bell, Wash., 570 P2d 138, 95 ALR

The courts have been unwilling to give a wrongful

defendant such a windfall to avoid liability and this court should
not become the exception to the overwhelming rule.

Fischer v.

Moore, 183 Colo. 392, 517 P2d 458 (1973).

-6-
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN NOT GRANTING THE PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
A NEW TRIAL SINCE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE JURY'S APPORTIONMENT
OF 86% OF THE NEGLIGENCE TO THE PLAINTIFFS
As has been shown by the Plaintiff's rebuttal in Point I,
there was no evidence before the court to enable the jury to find
that the Plaintiffs were more negligent than was the Defendant.
The evidence was so totally lacking that the jury could find
against the Plaintiffs on the issue of comparative negligence
.only by speculating that a fire extinguisher would have stopped
the fire in the engine compartment and, thereby, prevented 86%
of the damage.
The whole of the evidence makes clear that the Plaintiffs
could never have been 86% at fault for the fire.

Therefore, there

was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding and a new
trial should be granted if a directed verdict is not ordered in
favor of the Plaintiffs as requested in Point I.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT THAT THE
PLAINTIFFS' HAD FAILED TO PROVE A LOSS OF
PROFITS
Rather than restate the Plaintiffs' position regarding
the sufficiency of the Plaintiffs' evidence, the Court is respectfully and earnestly directed to the detailed treatment of the
facts and evidence set forth in the Plaintiffs' prior brief.
Comments here will be limited to rebutting specific arguments set
forth by the Defendant.
First, the Defendant, at pages 27 and 28 of its brief,
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quotes testimony by Mr. Canter in an attempt to show a lack of
sufficient certainty as to the Plaintiffs' loss of profits.

The

key point here is that the testimony quoted does not go to calculation of lost profits or to whether or not the Plaintiffs were
awarded

~ontracts

by Amoco Minerals.

The context of the testimony clearly shows that Mr. Canter
was testifying of his attempts to find work for the Plaintiffs'
logging units during the time period before he was informed by
Amoco Minerals that he had been awarded the Alzada job.

The

Plaintiffs stipulate that they were uncertain of being awarded the
Alzada Contract before they were awarded the contract by Mr. Lewis.
However, as should be clear by now, the Plaintiffs and Mr. Lewis
of Amoco Minerals both testified that once Mr. Lewis notified the
Plaintiffs that the job was theirs, the uncertainty ceased.

The

job would have been performed by the Plaintiffs but for the loss
of their logging unit caused by the Defendant.

Therefore, the

Defendant's attempt to mischaracterize Mr. Canter's testimony must
be rejected by the Court.
Using the foregoing mischaracterization of Mr. Canter's
testimony as an inaccurate foundation for further argument, the
Defendant next argues that because a written contract was never
signed, it was speculative as to whether the Plaintiffs would have
performed the Alzada job.

To the contrary, the testimony offered

showed that it was more than reasonably certain that the Plaintiffs would have performed the Amoco Minerals jobs.

Mr. Lewis

testified as follows:
Q

A

Now, as I understand your testimony, you didn't
have authority to sign the final prepared contract,
is that correct?
Correct.

Right.
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Q

In the conduct of your business, during that period
of time, did you have authority to select the contractors, though?

A

I had authority to recommend the contractors. And in
two and-a-half year's history, John Squyres has never
gone against a geologist's recommendation.
(T. 193)

Mr. Canter testified as on cross examination as follows:
Q

Mr. Canter, isn't it customarily the practice that if
you enter into a contract for doing work with these
companies, that there would be a written contract?

A

Yes.

Q

And in this case there were no written contracts?

A

They were forthcoming.
They ususally don't deliver
the contracts until immediately before the work is to
be done, customarily.

Q

Okay. And until you signed that contract, do you feel
you are bound on those contracts?

A

No.

Q

Do you think Amoco Minerals is bound on the contract?

A

No.

Q

What you're telling me is that when Mr. Lewis called
you on October 14th and told you that you had the project, you didn't feel like you could hold them to it
if they decided to change their mind on who was going
to do the job?

A

Without a written contract, I suppose they could
change their minds, although, historically, we have
never had that happen once we have been officially
contacted and awarded a contract.
(T. 215-216)
(Emphasis added.)

Additionally, the testimony was that the Amoco Minerals geologists
h~ve

their own budgets to work with and the Plaintiffs' services

were so greatly desired at Amoco Minerals that different Amoco
geologists were competing with each other to obtain the Plaintiffs'
services (T. 172).

There was, therefore, sufficient evidence to

allow the jury to find that written contracts would have been
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signed and ~he Plaintiffs would have performed the jobs but for
the Defendant's wrongful conduct.
Finally, the Defendant on appeal correctly states the
rule regarding the calculation of loss of profits from a lost
contrac~;

namely:

gross contract profits less the costs of per-

forming the contract.

This is exactly the rule used by the

Plaintiffs' in presenting their evidence at trial, although at
trial the Defendant tried to avoid this rule and the trial court
could not grasp that this rule of law applied.

As was shown by

.the Plaintiffs' prior brief, the evidence provided by both Mr.
Cantor and Mr. Lewis of Amoco Minerals showed that gross profits
of no less than $37,690.40 would have been received by the Plaintiffs' from their lost contracts.

Costs of performing the con-

tracts would have been $4,568.00, leaving a net loss to the
Plaintiffs of $33,122.40.
1

Plaintiffs' Exhibits 12, 14, 15, 16,
'

and 17, and the testimony of Mr. Canter and Mr. Lewis clearly
showed how the loss was to be figured (T. 175-lBZ, 209-214).
Unfortunately, as noted in the Plaintiffs' prior brief
at page 30, the trial court, over the Plaintiffs' objection,
allowed the Defendant to question the Plaintiffs regarding matters
totally unrelated to the calculation of loss of profits from the
lost contracts.

The court improperly allowed the Defendant to

question Canter regarding the Plaintiffs' gross income for the
entire year even though such evidence had no bearing whatsoever

on calculating the loss of profits from the specific lost contracts
(T. 227-228).

It was inthe context of this improper line of

questioning that Mr. Canter stated that he could not tell what
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the final over-all profit to the company would have been after
general overhead was taken into account ( T. 227) .,

Mr. Can L() r

had made clear previously that the general overhead would have
remained the same regardless of whether or not the Plaintiffs
had

per~ormed

the lost contracts and that general overhead was

not material in figuring the loss of profits from the lost contracts (T. 211, 225-226).

Therefore, the Defendant's attempt to

utilize this improper line of questioning on appeal must also be
rejected by the Court.
As noted in the Plaintiffs' prior brief, the Defendant did
not even move for a directed verdict on the ground that the Plaintiffs' damages could not be reasonably calculated.

There clearly

was sufficient evidence presented for the issue of lost profits
to be submitted to the jury and the court erred in directing its
verdict against the Plaintiffs.
CONCLUSION
The record is replete with errors committed by the trial
court.

This Court is respectfully requested to set matters

straight by granting to the Plaintiffs' the relief requested in
their prior brief.
5

Respectfully submitted this /
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